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Most constitutional theorists in America and Britain are 
primarily interested in the contents of their respective 
constitutions.  They pay less attention (and in Britain far less 
attention) to the methods that judges employ to derive those 
contents, and almost no attention to the philosophical aspects of 
judges’ interpretive methods.  This article attempts to redress 
this imbalance by giving a distinctly philosophical description of 
the principal methods of constitutional interpretation that judges 
are inclined to follow in these two countries, and by developing 
the important distinction between the interpretation and the 
reception of a constitutional text.   
The act of interpretation is active and rational; the event of 
reception is passive and pre-rational.  In a sense, the 
phenomenon of reception makes every judge into a kind of 
“strict textualist” at some point in the interpretive process.  
Rather than seeking to criticize the many competing methods of 
constitutional interpretation, or to decide which one is “best,” 
this article merely seeks to understand them for what they are.  
The result is a comparative law exposition that is simultaneously 
legal and philosophical. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF “METHODS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION” 
As the highest level of positive law within the state, a “constitution” 
in the general sense of the word prescribes and establishes the basic 
structures of government, including the organs and processes of law 
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creation and law enforcement.  The constitution also can, and usually 
does, prescribe or preclude the contents of future statutes and other types 
of governmental action in three distinct ways: (1) by allocating 
competencies amongst the different branches of the national government 
(balance of powers); (2) by establishing the boundaries which separate 
the authority of the national government from that of sub-national units 
of government (federalism); and (3) by codifying certain individual (and 
even group) rights and liberties that government is bound to respect and 
enforce (human rights).1  Although the distinction between method and 
result is sometimes difficult to discern and maintain, this article does not 
concern itself so much with the contents of the constitutions of the 
United States and the United Kingdom as with the methods of 
interpretation that are used to produce specific contents from the texts 
that comprise the constitutions.  The article’s goals are twofold: first, to 
give concise philosophical descriptions (or interpretations) of these 
methods, primarily from a Wittgensteinean point of view;2 and second, 
to advance our understanding of the problem of judicial methods in 
general by comparing the practices of constitutional interpretation 
followed in the United States with those followed in the United 
Kingdom.  Of course, many different social actors have occasion to 
interpret the constitution for a variety of public and private purposes: for 
example, several U.S. Presidents have publicly defended their vetoes of 
certain pieces of legislation on the ground that they regarded the 
measures in question to be unconstitutional.  That said, however, we will 
focus in this article on judicial methods for interpreting the constitution, 
inasmuch as they are more readily accessible and transparent than the 
methods used by non-judicial actors, as well as more significant in terms 
of their impact on the legal system. 
The most obvious formal difference between the Constitution of the 
United States and that of the United Kingdom is that the former is 
                                                          
1 HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 64-65 (Bonnie 
Litschewski Paulson & Stanley Paulson trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1934). 
2 One of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein has 
had a considerable influence on legal theory and the philosophy of law in America, 
especially when it comes to thinking about what it means to “follow” a legal rule.  His 
masterwork is PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., photo. reprint, 
MacMillan Co. 1964) (1953) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS], and one of his most powerful discussions of rule following is 
contained in pages 80e-88e of that work.  For a representative collection of articles about 
the relevance of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to legal problems, see generally 
WITTGENSTEIN AND LAW (Dennis Patterson ed., 2004). 
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codified in a single text, whereas the latter is derived from a large 
number of sources: statutes, common law, royal prerogatives, unwritten 
customs and conventions, and treaties such as the European Convention 
on Human Rights.  From the standpoint of the theory of interpretation, 
however, this difference is not as significant as what the judiciaries of 
both nations have in common: namely, American and British judges 
alike always take something as their object of interpretation when they 
are engaged in the project of construing the constitution.  Whether this 
constitutional “object” is a discrete and well-defined document (as in the 
U.S.) or the widely accepted expression of a traditional set of written and 
unwritten institutional arrangements (as in the U.K.), the event of 
judicial interpretation always exhibits three formally distinct elements: 
(1) a constitutional “text” — an object of interpretation — in the largest 
sense of the word; (2) a second text — the interpretation as such — 
which the judge wishes to derive from the canonical constitutional text; 
and (3) the explicit or implicit method of interpretation with which the 
judge makes the passage from (1) to (2). 
It almost goes without saying that constitutional interpretations are 
also a product of history, including the social factors that make the 
interpreter the person that she is and that predetermine the realm of legal 
answers that she experiences as plausible.  To pursue this line of 
thinking, however, is to adopt what Ronald Dworkin calls the “external 
point of view of the sociologist or historian” rather than the “internal 
point of view” of the judge who must decide a case.3  In other words, the 
causes of a decision are not the same as its grounds, even if the very 
project of justifying judicial results can be interpreted as biased or 
ideological from certain political points of view.  Thus, while the 
concept of history imputes judicial decisions to their causes, in this 
article the concept of methods of interpretation gives an internal account 
of the different techniques that judges employ to justify and ground their 
decisions.  Of course any given court decision may or may not make its 
interpretive method explicit.  Indeed, judicial opinions sometimes deploy 
several logically distinct methods in the same case, without discussing 
how the methods work together or even whether their premises are 
consistent with one another.  For reasons of analytical clarity, therefore, 
this article will separately describe the most important methods of 
constitutional interpretation as ideal types — logical tools for identifying 
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and classifying the various interpretive strategies that can be found in the 
reports of real cases. 
As Wittgenstein was the first to notice,4 the discipline of projective 
geometry is an apt metaphor for thinking about the important distinction 
between the method and the contents of an interpretation.  Think of the 
linguistic expression of a particular constitutional text — one that has 
not yet undergone interpretation in a particular case before a judge — as 
if it were a two-dimensional shape lying on a plane.  Imagine, for 
example, that the phrase “due process of law,” which appears in both the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States, were like figure A in plane I in the following drawing: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The sense of the metaphor, in a nutshell, is just this: understanding how 
a judge has interpreted (or will interpret) the meaning of “due process of 
law” is analogous to the task of understanding how a geometer might 
project figure A onto plane II.  Just as there are, in principle, infinite 
methods of projection in projective geometry (both orthogonal and non-
orthogonal), so too there is at least a plenitude of methods for 
interpreting the meaning of the linguistic signs “due process of law”: 
original intent, the plain meaning of the language, the underlying 
purpose of the words, following precedent, and so forth.  In the case of 
geometry, it is easy to see that the shape of the figure that is projected 
onto plane II from plane I depends on which method is used: as the 
drawing shows, hypothetical method M1 (which is orthogonal) produces 
figure A1, whereas hypothetical method M2 (which is non-orthogonal) 
yields the different figure A2.  The same kind of thing holds true in the 
case of interpreting legal language.  A phrase like “due process of law” 
will receive one kind of interpretation if the judge adheres to the method 
                                                          
4 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR 205 (Rush Rhees ed. & Anthony 
Kenny trans. 1974) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR]. 
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of ascertaining and following the text’s “original intent,” and a different 
kind of interpretation if the judge decides to follow well-established 
precedent without regard to whether past cases are consistent with what 
the first interpreter would call the text’s original intent.  And even if the 
ultimate legal result of a particular case happens to be the same 
regardless of which theory of interpretation is used, the process of 
getting there and the judge’s explanation of the result are both functions 
(in a quasi-mathematical sense) of the method she uses. 
For present purposes, the most important thing to notice about the 
metaphor of projection is that one cannot infer or judge the nature of 
figure A just by looking at its projections (A1 and A2) alone.  Instead, 
one also needs to know the method of projection, and only with this 
information in hand can one infer the nature of figure A from figures A1 
or A2.  Just as it would be mathematically naive to ask whether figures 
A1 and A2 are “accurate projections” of figure A without knowing the 
techniques according to which they were produced, so too it is 
philosophically naive to ask whether a given statement about the 
meaning of the constitution is “correct” without knowing the technique 
according to which it was produced and applied.   
This procedure for thinking about constitutional interpretation has 
the advantage of focusing attention on the political and jurisprudential 
issues associated with a judge’s selection of an interpretive method — 
issues which logically precede, shape, and can even predetermine the 
results of constitutional litigation.  To illustrate: whether there are such 
things as non-enumerated rights in the U.S. Constitution (including the 
so-called “right to privacy” that lies at the legal heart, so to speak, of the 
abortion controversy in America) cannot logically depend on what the 
constitutional content “says” when considered apart from any method of 
reading or hearing what it says.  So long as there is a category difference 
between a legal rule and its application there will always be a human 
being who “listens” to what the text has to say according to some 
method, however rudimentary it may be.  The main point is that disputes 
about the meaning of the constitution in a given context very often cover 
over and obscure the existence of more fundamental disagreements 
about the appropriate method or methods for determining meaning. 
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II.  JUDICIAL VERSUS LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY ON THE 
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Ever since Chief Justice John Marshall declared, in Marbury v. 
Madison, “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is,”5 Supreme Court interpretations of 
the United States Constitution have enjoyed a very high level of 
immunity from revision by legislation and executive action.  While the 
Supreme Court derives its institutional authority to interpret the 
Constitution solely from the existence of a concrete case or controversy 
within the meaning of Article III,6 almost all legislative and executive 
officials at both the federal and state levels have come to accept the 
Court’s constitutional holdings as authoritative, almost as if they were 
extensions of the constitutional text itself.  Among other things, this 
implies that the Court has (or has been ceded) the power to hold federal 
and state statutes unconstitutional in cases within its jurisdiction that 
properly present the question of constitutionality, and when the Court 
does so the implementation of the legislative program in question is 
frequently stopped cold in its tracks.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
invalidated more than 150 statutory provisions during the past hundred 
years alone.7  Of course there are some cases in which the Court itself 
will defer to another branch of government on questions of constitutional 
interpretation (the judicially created “political question” doctrine), and 
every now and then commentators and public officials have asserted that 
there is really no authoritative interpreter of the Constitution in the 
United States, and that each branch of government has a co-equal duty 
and right to interpret the Constitution as it sees fit in the performance of 
its official duties.8  Other commentators claim, more cautiously and with 
greater plausibility, that there is simply no definitive theoretical answer 
to the question whether there is a single authoritative interpreter of the 
Constitution in the United States.9  Theory aside, however, it is widely 
accepted as a matter of custom and legal culture that only the 
cumbersome and lengthy amendment processes specified in Article V of 
                                                          
5 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1805). 
6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
7 Martha Neil, Cases & Controversies: Some Decisions Are All the Rage — Literally, 
ABA J. 41 (Oct. 2005). 
8 Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 985-86 (1987). 
9 Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 32 (2d ed. 
2002). 
WOLCHER - LAST REVISION 4/11/2006  8:53 PM 
2006] Philosophical Investigation of Constitutional Interpretation 7 
the Constitution can overturn a Supreme Court decision that renders a 
specific and unqualified constitutional interpretation.10 
It is obvious that the relative degree of finality of Supreme Court 
decisions on the meaning of the Constitution must be distinguished from 
their infallibility, for as Justice Robert Jackson famously remarked in 
Brown v. Allen, “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are 
infallible only because we are final.”11  Nevertheless, the fact of finality 
raises the stakes, both politically and jurisprudentially, on the question of 
how the Supreme Court does or should go about the task of 
interpretation.  In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the stakes are 
much smaller than in the United States on the question of which methods 
of interpretation judges do or should employ in deciding cases that raise 
constitutional issues.  This is because the British Constitution consists of 
a polyglot of texts and arrangements that can always be supplemented, 
revised, and even repealed by Parliament.12  In short, in the United 
Kingdom the contents of the Constitution (as interpreted by the courts) 
are subordinate to the principle of legislative supremacy, whereas in the 
United States it is the other way around.  This is why it is often said, 
albeit with some overstatement, that in the United States the Constitution 
is what the Supreme Court says it is, but in Britain the Constitution is 
what Parliament says it is.  It is no wonder that American lawyers, 
judges, and legal academics pay a great deal of attention to methods of 
constitutional interpretation: as a practical matter these methods replace 
the political process as the primary external (or “objective”) constraint 
on judicial authority to say what the law of the Constitution is.  As a 
consequence of the foregoing factors, questions concerning the proper 
method of constitutional interpretation occupy a much greater role in 
American academic and political thought than they do in the United 
Kingdom, and, not surprisingly, the American literature on the subject is 
significantly larger.  To the extent that questions of constitutional 
interpretation do arise in Britain, they tend not to be different in 
principle than questions of statutory interpretation or common law 
development generally.  For that reason this article will devote most of 
its attention to the various interpretive methods used and debated within 
the United States, and will return to the case of the United Kingdom only 
                                                          
10 See generally U.S. CONST. art. V. 
11 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953). 
12 See CONSTITUTIONS OF MODERN STATES: SELECTED TEXTS AND COMMENTARY 182 
(Leslie Wolf-Phillips ed., 1968). 
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after the main problems and lines of controversy concerning the 
interpretation of the American Constitution have been clarified. 
 
III.  METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
It is of course factually possible for a judge consciously to 
manipulate the techniques of constitutional interpretation so as to justify 
a result that she has reached on purely personal grounds, and 
undoubtedly this has occurred more than a few times during the long 
history of American constitutional law.  But pretending to interpret is not 
the same as interpreting, and this article is concerned with describing 
and evaluating only the latter activity, leaving for another day the task of 
developing a philosophically robust account of the phenomenon of 
pretence in the American judicial system.  Thus, we will henceforth 
focus our attention on the paradigmatic situation of a judge who seeks in 
good faith to determine what she takes to be the “command of the 
Constitution” and to apply the meaning of this command to a particular 
dispute without consciously attempting to smuggle in her own personal 
values and preferences.  Although it is obviously true that such values 
and preferences affect the result through psychological and social 
mechanisms of which the judge who acts in good faith is unaware, it 
bears repeating that this article seeks to analyze the internal point of 
view of judges who wish to ground their interpretations and not the 
external point of view of social scientists and historians who wish to 
explain judicial behavior by its causes. 
As the previous remarks may suggest, the purely psychological 
hallmark of a genuine act of judicial interpretation is the judge’s 
conscious submission to an authority that is external to herself — in this 
case, the text of the Constitution as mediated through one or more 
methods of interpretation that the judge employs to construe it.  Indeed, 
the formula Legal Text + Method of Interpretation + Good Faith 
Judicial Work = Legal Meaning formally describes none other than the 
structure of the much-vaunted value, in democratic societies at least, of 
the rule of law itself.  In the United States, primarily because of the 
earlier-noted general acceptance of judicial supremacy on matters of 
constitutional interpretation, the subject of judges’ interpretive practices 
in construing the Constitution looms large both in political discourse and 
in legal theory.  Just as American political rhetoric frequently opposes 
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the figure of the “strict constructionist” to that of the “judicial activist,” 
so too the theory of interpretation opposes “originalism” and 
“textualism” to another set of methods that can be called, 
simultaneously, both “non-originalist” and “constructivist.”  Given that 
submission to an external constraint on the determination of meaning is 
both a logical and psychological precondition of the activity known as 
“legal interpretation,” the debate in America about which method is best 
or most appropriate in a constitutional democracy is not, strictly 
speaking, about a choice between lawfulness and lawlessness in judicial 
decision making.  Rather, this debate refers to a choice amongst 
interpretive constraints, all of which are external and law-like in Herbert 
Wechsler’s precise sense of the term “neutral principles”: rational 
criteria of sufficient neutrality and generality to cover many other cases 
in the future, as opposed to naked “act[s] of willfulness or will” that seek 
only to establish a particular result in one case.13  That a judge’s 
submission to a particular interpretive constraint can (and usually does) 
produce a variety of social and political consequences is obvious; but it 
must be stressed again that this article seeks to understand the 
interpretive process as such — i.e., as a phenomenon — rather than to 
subject it to social criticism. 
A.  Strict Textualism 
Since we have left the phenomenon of judicial pretense for another 
day, it behooves us to ask what a judge who in good faith employs a 
“textualist” method of interpretation actually does in the course of 
generating constitutional meaning.  In this article we are interested in 
understanding the activity that certain judges call “textualism,” leaving 
to more metaphysically inclined minds the task of deciding whether 
textualism is “really” possible or true.  With Wittgenstein, we will not 
try to specify the act of interpretation by means of the object that is 
interpreted, but rather by the technique of interpretation.14  I must 
emphasize that an investigation of common methods of interpretation is 
not the same as an investigation of the common opinions of those who 
follow them.  The “truths” of law are not determined by a consensus of 
opinion, for the opinion that “X” means Y, however widespread, does 
not tell us how the sign “Y” itself is interpreted and applied.  As 
                                                          
13 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 9, 11 (1959). 
14 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, WITTGENSTEIN’S LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHICAL 
PSYCHOLOGY, 1946-47, at 48 (P.T. Geach ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1989) (1988). 
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Wittgenstein puts it, an answer to the question “How is that meant?” 
merely “exhibits the relationship between two linguistic expressions.”15  
No, what is called a technique or method of constitutional interpretation 
is not determined by a consensus of opinion, but rather by a consensus of 
action: 
There is no opinion at all; it is not a question of opinion.  
They [the truths of logic] are determined by a consensus 
of action: a consensus of doing the same thing, reacting 
the same way.  There is a consensus but it is not a 
consensus of opinion.  We all act the same way, walk the 
same way, count the same way.16 
Thus, if we notice that there are two methods of interpreting the same 
expression in the Constitution, we should not take this to mean that the 
expression has “two meanings”; rather, we should take it to mean that in 
applying the same expression people just proceed according to different 
methods.  Period.  To put our motives succinctly, we simply draw 
attention to what judges are really doing and refrain from making any 
grand claims about the meaning of the Constitution.17 
To begin our investigation of textualism, it should be noted that 
although it is quite common for judges in constitutional cases to read one 
provision of the constitution in light of another, this kind of intra-textual 
hermeneutics is not what most American lawyers mean when they speak 
of “strict textualism” in constitutional law.  What is more, although 
textualism and originalism are often conflated, sometimes under the 
label “interpretivism,” they are nonetheless analytically distinct 
methods.  To be sure, it is possible to identify a mode of “textual” 
interpretation at work in decisions that inquire into the meaning that the 
words of the Constitution had for “the framers” or for the “average 
person in the street in 1789.”  But the latter method is best called 
originalism rather than textualism, because in its purest form strict 
textualism is inconsistent with any kind of interpretation, including even 
interpretation according to the original intent of the framers.  In a 
nutshell, strict textualism is the belief that: 
                                                          
15 WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR, supra note 4, at 45. 
16 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, WITTGENSTEIN’S LECTURES ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
MATHEMATICS: CAMBRIDGE, 1939, at 183-84 (Cora Diamond ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 
1989) (1976). 
17 See FRIEDRICH WAISMANN, WITTGENSTEIN AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 186 (Brian 
McGuinness ed., Joachim Schulte & Brian McGuiness trans., 1979). 
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[I]t is possible to put down marks so self-sufficiently 
perspicuous that they repel interpretation; it is the thesis 
that one can write sentences of such precision and 
simplicity that their meanings leap off the page in a way 
no one — no matter what his or her situation or point of 
view — can ignore.18 
For a judge who employs this method there is no occasion to interpret 
any words and sentences that she receives as being absolutely pellucid in 
relation to the dispute that she must decide.  When, for example, Article 
II, Section 1 of the Constitution specifies that the President’s term of 
office is “four Years,” the strict textualist just receives and knows, 
without experiencing the slightest doubt, that the word “Year” refers to 
the amount of time that it takes the planet Earth to make one circuit 
around the Sun, as opposed to, say, the amount of time that it takes the 
planet Jupiter to make such a circuit, even though the linguistic sign 
“Year” does not on its face “say” that the former interpretation is 
correct.19 
The first step towards any philosophically sophisticated 
understanding of textualism is to recognize that there is a fundamental 
sense in which we are all textualists, for there is an important distinction 
between the interpretation and the reception of a text — any text.  At its 
most basic level, interpretation is the activity of transforming one 
linguistic sign into another linguistic sign according to some method of 
transformation.  Reception, on the other hand, is the activity of using a 
linguistic sign without experiencing any doubt about the sign’s role in 
one’s actions.  It is possible to notice the distinction between 
interpretation and reception by paying close attention to what actually 
happens when we respond to authoritative legal texts; if we do this, 
Wittgenstein notes that “in some cases you will find that you do 
something which might be called interpreting before obeying, in some 
cases not.”20  For example, most native English speakers would receive 
the word “Year” in Article II, Section 1 without consciously reflecting 
on the possibility that it is ambiguous or vague: they would simply see 
                                                          
18 Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THE FATE OF LAW 159, 
161 (Austin Sarat & Thomas Kearns eds., 1991). 
19 U.S. CONST. art. II § 1. 
20 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS 3 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter 
WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS]. 
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“Year” and apply it conventionally — in an “automatic” way21 — 
without any prior reflection or rational calculation.  In such cases it 
would be misleading to say that people “interpret” the word, or even 
recognize its “meaning,” for both interpretation and meaning-recognition 
are conscious processes in which a linguistic sign is seen as representing 
or signifying something other than itself.  Formally speaking, 
“Whenever we interpret a symbol in one way or another, the 
interpretation is a new symbol added to the old one.”22  Hence the 
interpretation or meaning of the sign “X” is always some other sign, 
“Y,” which itself can (and indeed must) be unreflectively received in a 
certain way in order to constitute the ground of subsequent human 
action.  Another way to put this is to say that the task of interpretation 
depends on an antecedent state of doubt, regardless of the basis on which 
the doubt rests, and that where there is no doubt there is also no 
interpretation. 
Consider a native German speaker trying to discover the length of an 
American President’s term of office: imagine that she consults the text 
of the Constitution but does not immediately understand the word 
“Year” in Article II, Section 1 because she has little or no competence in 
English.  In this case she would need to translate the English word 
“Year” into the German word “Jahr” (by using an English-to-German 
dictionary, for example) before being able to understand or apply the 
Constitution’s meaning on this point.  Her act of interpretation would 
consciously transform one linguistic sign (“Year”) into another linguistic 
sign (“Jahr”) by means of a method of transformation (a dictionary).  It 
is important to recognize that the linguistic sign comprising the 
translation itself (in this case “Jahr”) normally is not then further 
interpreted; rather, it is simply received as a basis for action without any 
further reflection.  However long the act of interpretation takes, and 
however detailed its product may be, there will eventually come a point 
in time at which the linguistic sign that constitutes the final 
interpretation of the original linguistic sign is simply understood without 
more ado.  Wittgenstein aptly summarizes the important distinction 
between interpretation and reception by saying that one can keep on 
interpreting a linguistic sign like “Year” — or for that matter any other 
provision of the United States Constitution — for as long as one wants, 
                                                          
21 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW]. 
22 WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS, supra note 20, at 33. 
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“[b]ut adopt whatever model or scheme you may, it will have a bottom 
level, and there will be no such thing as an interpretation of that.”23 
The distinction between interpretation and reception transcends the 
distinction between the external and internal points of view on law.  To 
be sure, the way someone receives a text can always be viewed, from the 
external standpoint of an observer, as being a function of history, 
culture, and personal circumstance, and therefore as radically relative to 
the context of the one who receives it.  And it is undeniably true that the 
deeds that depend upon reception, such as the application of the law to a 
particular case, are at least in some sense contingent on the receiver’s 
concrete social and psychological position.  Nevertheless, the 
interpretation/reception distinction bridges the gap between the internal 
and external points of view on law by demonstrating the limits of legal 
interpretation, or rather, of what is called “legal interpretation.”  It is not 
a contradiction, and still less a reproach, to say that a judge’s 
interpretation of a legal text is simultaneously well founded and 
unfounded, for being well founded means that the interpretation follows 
from the original text according to this or that accepted method of 
transformation, whereas being unfounded means that the judge simply 
knows how to go on — how to act — with the signs that make up the 
interpretation itself without feeling the need for any additional 
grounding.  If the distinction between the external and the internal points 
of view on law rightly draws attention to the difference between the 
causes and the grounds of a judge’s decision, then the distinction 
between the interpretation and the reception of a legal text stays within 
the realm of grounding as such in order to avoid mythologizing it.  The 
latter distinction merely provides a phenomenological description of 
what the judicial act of giving grounds for an interpretation actually is — 
how it is lived as a phenomenon — and, in doing so, it also shows or 
suggests the most that any act of grounding could possibly be. 
If the phenomenon of reception proves that everyone eventually 
becomes a textualist at some point in the interpretive process (if only at 
the last point), then someone who calls herself a strict textualist simply 
stops the interpretive process before it begins, without pursuing the 
white rabbit of doubt down the interpretive rabbit hole.  The words of 
the Constitution mean exactly what they “tell” the strict textualist they 
mean in an initial event of reception that is devoid of all doubt and that 
is missing any self-conscious extraction of meaning.  This event of 
                                                          
23 Id. at 34. 
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reception can be profitably compared to the phenomenon of seeing only 
one aspect of an ambiguous figure.  In the context of a well-known 
gestalt drawing called the duck-rabbit, for example, it is possible to see 
what the picture represents in at least two different aspects.  If you look 
at it one way, it appears to be a rabbit; but if you look at it another way, 
it appears to be a duck: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein notes that there may be 
certain people who have always seen this figure as, say, a rabbit, and 
have never seen it in any other way.24  For them the figure would clearly 
be the picture of a rabbit and only a rabbit.  Indeed, Wittgenstein also 
observes that there could even be people who are “blind” to the 
possibility of seeing the figure as a duck despite having the figure’s 
ambiguity pointed out to them in no uncertain terms.  The twin 
phenomena of seeing-as and aspect blindness are perfect metaphors for 
understanding the event of reception as it is experienced by the strict 
textualist: she is like someone who is capable of seeing the figure of the 
duck-rabbit in only one of its aspects, and who goes on to insist that it 
“clearly and plainly means” only this one thing.  Such a person would 
suffer from an absence of imagination (or any sense of ambiguity) that is 
analogous to aspect blindness.  She would tend to judge non-standard 
interpretations of what she calls clear linguistic signs like duck-rabbits as 
plainly wrong and irrational rather than as just plain different.  To 
borrow Catherine MacKinnon’s extremely apt phrase, strict textualists 
                                                          
24 WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 194e. 
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usually represent their own point of view on the meaning of the 
Constitution as the “standard for point-of-viewlessness.”25 
If called upon to justify the resulting decision, the strict textualist 
will assert that her method is the quintessential example of judicial 
restraint, inasmuch as it follows the explicit words written down by the 
framers of the Constitution itself rather than attempting to alter the 
meaning of those words by an act of interpretation that by definition 
supplements the authoritative language of the Constitution with language 
written by unelected judges.26  In this respect strict textualism can 
profitably be compared to those forms of religious fundamentalism 
whose adherents believe that holy texts are the words of God that do not 
need to be interpreted by human beings in order to be immediately 
understood.  That strict textualists, like religious fundamentalists, 
sometimes (or often) disagree among themselves about what the 
canonical text “says” is of course a function of the fact that history 
touches everyone at least somewhat differently in distributing its effects, 
just as a widespread consensus about meaning shows that history often 
produces similar effects amongst similarly situated people.  That said, 
however, it is important to understand that any subsequent agreements or 
disagreements about the contents of received meanings are not, strictly 
speaking, ingredients of the phenomenon of reception itself, without 
which no text could ever become an element of human behavior.  If, as 
some of their critics say, strict textualists are uncritical and linguistically 
naive in approaching the beginning of the judicial process, then the point 
of bringing out the difference between interpretation and reception is to 
show that in the end they behave just like everyone else.  As 
Wittgenstein puts it, “When I obey a rule, I do not choose.  I obey the 
rule blindly.”27 
B.  Originalism 
The so-called “strict originalist” determines meaning according to 
two and only two criteria: (1) the literal text of the Constitution; and (2) 
                                                          
25 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOC’Y 635, 638-39 
(1983). 
26 See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Ely’s Theory of Judicial Review, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87 (1981) 
(“[A]ctivist judicial review is inconsistent with democratic theory because it substitutes 
the policy choices of unelected, unaccountable judges for those of the people’s 
representatives.”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3-4 (Fall 1971). 
27 WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 85e. 
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the specific intent of those who drafted and/or ratified that text.  The 
origin of this attitude towards legal interpretation can be traced to 
Aristotle, who argued in the Nicomachean Ethics that in cases of doubt 
about the meaning of a law a judge should endeavor “to say what the 
legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have 
put into his law if he had known.”28  Thus, from the standpoint of strict 
originalists like dissenting Justice George Sutherland in Home Building 
& Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, “[t]he whole aim of construction, as applied 
to a provision of the Constitution, is…to ascertain and give effect to the 
intent of its framers and the people who adopted it.”29  For judges like 
Sutherland, the surest guide to authorial intent is to read the words of the 
Constitution for the norms that they state or clearly imply,30 and in this 
respect most strict originalists are also textualists, at least with respect to 
those portions of the Constitution that they receive (without doubt) as 
being clear in meaning.  As for those provisions of the Constitution that 
virtually everyone admits are vague or ambiguous (“equal protection” 
and “necessary and proper,” to cite two examples), the strict originalist 
looks solely at the written historical record of the context in which the 
text in question was proposed and ratified in order to determine what the 
framers and/or those who ratified the provision must have had in mind as 
its specific purpose.31  For example, a perfectly consistent strict 
originalist construing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would find it highly relevant, if not conclusive, that the 
congressmen who ratified this provision in 1866 also approved of formal 
legal segregation by race in the public schools of the District of 
Columbia.  She might very well say that this evidence of Congress’s 
specific intent in 1866 does not allow the Supreme Court to declare (as it 
did in Brown v. Board of Education), that public school segregation 
violates the Equal Protection Clause, even if it is true that general 
                                                          
28 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1796 
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). 
29 290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934). 
30 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 
(1980). 
31 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 9-11 passim (1997).  Although it is important to 
distinguish the specific intent of the drafters of a constitutional provision (Berger’s point 
of reference) from the historical practices and understandings of the time from which one 
may deduce authorial intent as a general matter (Scalia’s point of reference), in the end 
these two approaches both proceed on the assumption that the meaning of the 
Constitution is fixed once and for all by the historical intent of the framers.  See Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. 
L.REV. 385 (2000). 
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American attitudes about the legitimacy of racial apartheid have changed 
since the nineteenth century.32  From the standpoint of strict originalism 
the meaning of the Constitution is immutably fixed by its language and 
its specific historical intent, and the only legitimate way for 
constitutional meaning to change is through the process of formal 
amendment. 
The strict originalist, like the textualist, believes that her method for 
interpreting the Constitution is the only one that is consistent with the 
democratic value of majority rule: if “We the People” (i.e. propertied 
white male citizens) made most of the basic constitutional rules in 1789 
and 1791, then the different “we the people” of 2005 have no alternative 
but to live with their predecessors’ choices unless and until they are able 
to assemble the legislative supermajorities necessary for a constitutional 
amendment.33  To be sure, the Constitution contains numerous 
constraints on the democratic principle of majority rule, and numerous 
protections of individual rights and liberties against majoritarian abuse.  
Yet from the point of view of a strict originalist the scope of these 
constraints, rights, and liberties is the product of what the text says and 
what those who adopted it intended it to mean.  In Wilson v. Arkansas, 
Justice Clarence Thomas furnished an excellent example of how this 
method works in practice when he ruled for the Court that police officers 
must “knock and announce” before searching a residence, not because 
the right to privacy outweighs the needs of law enforcement in such 
cases, or because such a result follows from precedent, but because this 
particular requirement happens to have been the state of the law in 1791, 
when the Fourth Amendment was ratified.34  Since federal judges are not 
elected but rather appointed for life, the strict originalist thinks that 
federal judges have no duty and no right to make value choices that are 
different from those the framers made.35  Whenever the Supreme Court 
declares an area of social or individual life “off limits” to legislative 
                                                          
32 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
33 See U.S. CONST. pmbl.  For an explanation of the strict originalist viewpoint, see, 
e.g., Bork, supra note 26, at 3-6 (Originalism is democratic because the “people” 
consented to the adoption of the Constitution, and “a Court that makes rather than 
implements value choices cannot be squared with the presuppositions of a democratic 
society.”); Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can 
Originalist Interpretation be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482, 1484-85 (1985). 
34 514 U.S. 927 (1995). 
35 See Bork, supra note 26, at 4-6.  See also Edward J. Melvin, Judicial Activism: The 
Violation of an Oath, 27 CATH. LAW. 283, 284 (1982) (“[W]hen a judge takes his oath to 
uphold the Constitution he promises to carry out the intention of its framers.”). 
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interference, its decision pro tanto chills or annihilates the normal 
exercise of democratic processes in that area.  Hence the theory of strict 
originalism also maintains that when the constitutional text is silent on 
the question of whether a particular legal right exists the courts have no 
business declaring that it does, and must defer to the action (or acquiesce 
in the inaction) of Congress and state legislatures concerning the subject 
matter in question. 
Not all self-identified originalists adhere to every tenet of strict 
originalism.  It is possible to identify a kind of moderate originalism in 
American jurisprudence that, although it agrees with strict originalism 
on the proposition that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed by its 
language and the framers’ historical intent, takes a broader view of what 
constitutes that intent.36  Since judges always deal with constitutional 
rules that are meant to be general in scope, and since the original intent 
of the framers must be described at some level of generality, this means 
that the judge’s choice of the relevant level of generality will usually 
determine the result of a case or line of cases.  That judges have 
discretion to choose the level of generality with which they characterize 
precedent is a feature of the interpretive process that has been well 
known at least since the early days of American Legal Realism.37  
Moderate originalists simply apply this basic insight to the context of 
characterizing the intent of the framers.  To combat the apparently 
unbridled judicial discretion that the choice of the level of generality 
seems to entail, strict originalists like Justice Antonin Scalia have called 
for the framers’ intent to be determined at the most specific level of 
abstraction, so as to leave open the largest possible space for subsequent 
legislative discretion.38  However, it is precisely at this point that 
moderate originalism distinguishes itself from the strict form of this 
method: the former stands ready to construe authorial intent more 
generally than the latter, at least in certain cases, especially those 
involving the protection of individual rights. 
Thus, for example, a moderate originalist might reject an 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment such as that given by the Court 
                                                          
36 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204, 205 (1980) (Claiming that moderate originalists are “more concerned with the 
adopters’ general purposes than with their intentions in a very precise sense”).  
37 See Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 ABA JOURNAL 71, 72-73 (1927). 
38 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (plurality 
opinion); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 45 (1997).  
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in Olmstead v. United States, which permitted the government to place 
warrantless wiretaps on telephones primarily on the ground that the 
technologies of telephones and wiretapping were completely unknown in 
1791 and hence are not mentioned in the text of the amendment or in its 
historical record.39  Instead, the moderate originalist might favor an 
interpretation that describes the framers’ intent as keeping “the state out 
of constitutionally protected areas until it has reason to believe that a 
specific crime has been or is being committed.”40  If it is true, as the 
Court in Olmstead observed, that the framers of the Fourth Amendment 
intended to protect “material things” such as persons, houses, papers, 
and effects from unwarranted governmental intrusion, it is no less true 
that they also intended to protect certain “areas of private life”: the 
former was their intended means, while the latter was their intended end.  
The difference between these two descriptions does not consist in the 
one being true and the other false, but rather in the level of generality 
that is chosen to describe (accurately in both cases) what the framers’ 
intent was.  To borrow Ronald Dworkin’s important distinction, the 
moderate originalist relies on the framers’ general “concepts” rather than 
their particular “conceptions,”41 thereby allowing judges to interpret the 
meaning of the Constitution so as to respond to changing historical 
circumstances without precipitating the need for a constitutional 
amendment every time a hitherto unforeseen technology or social 
phenomenon arises.  In this respect moderate originalism shares with 
non-originalist modes of interpretation at least a certain degree of 
acceptance of Chief Justice Marshall’s well-known dictum, in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, that “we must never forget that it is a 
constitution we are expounding…a constitution, intended to endure for 
ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of 
human affairs.”42 
Finally, it should be noted that there is another kind of originalism 
that agrees with the general premise that the determination of 
constitutional meaning should be guided by original intent, but that 
                                                          
39 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
40 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967) (effectively overruling Olmstead, 277 
U.S. 438 (1928)). 
41 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1977).  See also Paul Brest, The 
Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative 
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 1063, 1091-92 (1980-81) (“The fact is that all 
adjudication requires making choices among the levels of generality on which to 
articulate principles, and all such choices are inherently non-neutral.”). 
42 17 U.S. 316, 407, 415 (1819). 
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distinguishes itself from the positivistic bent of strict originalism by 
appealing to the alleged natural law underpinnings of the Constitution.  
Despite the fact that the founders had to make certain compromises that 
were inconsistent with natural law in order to induce the slave-holding 
states to ratify the Constitution, “natural law originalists” observe that 
the general intellectual milieu of the educated elite in the late 1700s, as 
well as important founding documents such as the Declaration of 
Independence, the Preamble to the Constitution, and the Federalist 
Papers, are all replete with explicit and implicit references to natural 
law.43  From this evidence of the intellectual history surrounding the 
adoption of the Constitution they draw the conclusion that the original 
intent of the framers was to write a text the ultimate purpose of which 
was to achieve the ends of government as described by a certain 
enlightenment conception of natural law — one which embraces 
fundamental values such as the consent of the governed, the rule of law, 
separation of powers, and individual rights.44  Therefore, natural law 
originalists believe that courts can and should interpret the text of the 
Constitution in light of its natural law purposes — not because (or just 
because) this is the morally right thing to do, but because this was how 
the authors of the Constitution themselves conceived of the text’s 
meaning.45 
It is obvious that to be of any use in interpreting the text of the 
Constitution, original intent in any of its many forms must be expressed 
in language.  That is, “original intent” must find its way into another 
text, exterior to the primary constitutional text, which judges consult in 
order to ascertain the meaning of the latter.  Once a judge determines it, 
the linguistic expression of “original intent” — whether in its strict, 
moderate or natural law form — will lead to different outcomes 
depending on the method by which it in turn is interpreted.  In other 
words, the legally relevant constitutional text “X” can indeed be 
interpreted in light of original intent “Y,” but the passage from the latter 
to the application of the Constitution in a real case creates a brand new 
problem of interpretation.  Indeed, one might even be tempted to 
suppose that the process of interpretation according to the tenets of 
                                                          
43 See generally U.S. CONST. pmbl.; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); 
THE FEDERALIST (Alexander Hamilton). 
44 See Charles R. Kesler, Natural Law and a Limited Constitution, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 549, 557 (1996); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. 
CAL. L.REV. 277, 393-96 (1985). 
45 Kesler, supra note 44, at 563-64. 
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original intent logically leads to an infinite regress, with new symbols 
together with new methods for interpreting those symbols being 
generated every time an act of interpretation adds words to those that are 
contained within the four corners of the object of interpretation as such.  
However, this temptation should be resisted.  As the previous discussion 
of the phenomenon of reception shows, the process of interpretation in 
fact always comes to an end at some point — the point at which there is 
no doubt remaining about what the words that make up the interpretation 
itself require the actor to do.46  Although many philosophers have 
noticed this fact, none has expressed it more beautifully than Pascal: 
Nothing, according to reason alone, is just in itself; all 
changes with time.  Custom creates the whole of equity, 
for the simple reason that it is accepted.  It is the 
mystical foundation of its authority; whoever carries it 
back to first principles destroys it.47 
Take a look at Supreme Court opinions discussing the original intent of 
the Constitution and you will find that reason’s end-point — the place 
where all doubt and interpretation ceases — usually comes very soon 
after the author expresses what she takes to be “original intent.”48  The 
terminus of any given empirical application of the methods discussed in 
this section is characterized by a judge “just knowing” (without any 
further reflection) what original intent “Y” requires her to do in the case 
at hand.  Reason is active, while reception is passive: if the one actively 
transforms “this” into “that,” the other passively accepts “that” for what 
it is.  Reason’s interpretations are to the phenomenon of reception as 
being awake is to sleeping: one might even say that reception allows 
reason to get its much-needed beauty sleep.  Moreover, neither the 
faculty of reason nor the reasonable could be what they are without the 
                                                          
46 See supra pp. 12-16. 
47 BLAISE PASCAL, PENSÉES: THE PROVINCIAL LETTERS 101 (1941). 
48 See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-34 (arguing that a survey of history 
leads to  the conclusion that the original intent of the Fourth Amendment requires police 
to “knock and announce” before entering site to be searched and then immediately 
concluding, “We now so hold”); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) 
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (referring to a survey of historical antipathy to homosexual 
acts and concluding that “[t]o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow 
protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching”); 
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24-40 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(relying upon a long survey of history regarding punitive damages in civil actions to 
conclude that “[s]ince jury-assessed punitive damages are a part of our living tradition 
that dates back prior to 1868, I would end the suspense and categorically affirm their 
validity.”). 
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assistance of a primordial phenomenon (reception) that in itself is neither 
reasonable nor unreasonable, but rather constitutes the condition of the 
possibility of the linguistic opposition that we draw between the 
“reasonable” and the “unreasonable.” 
C.  Non-Originalism 
In order to avoid confusion, we will say in this article that the term 
“non-originalism” refers to any purely negative theory that adopts a 
posture of critical opposition to the premises and practices of originalism 
and textualism.  We will use the word “constructivism” to name a 
number of different positive methods for interpreting the Constitution, 
all of which also distinguish themselves from originalism and textualism 
by giving one or more critiques of them.  In other words, a non-
originalist judge does not just reject originalism and textualism — for 
this alone would leave her own constitutional interpretations 
theoretically rudderless — she also necessarily accepts a different 
positive method for interpreting the Constitution.  In this section we will 
take up the critique of originalism and textualism first, and then, in the 
next section, we will discuss the three most important varieties of 
constructivism: following and incrementally adapting the doctrine laid 
down in precedent (evolutionism), construing the Constitution in 
accordance with contemporary values (moral readings of the 
constitution), and judicial policy-making (pragmatism). 
The non-originalist critique of originalism and textualism begins by 
noting that a truly radical purging of Supreme Court precedent would be 
required in the event that these methods were to be consistently applied 
to all questions of constitutional interpretation.  Literally hundreds of 
cases and lines of authority would have to be revisited and reconstructed 
from the ground up.49  For example, over the past century and a quarter 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly “incorporated” several provisions of 
the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, thereby requiring state governments to respect certain 
fundamental individual rights such as freedom of speech and religion 
that were binding only on the federal government prior to the adoption 
of the amendment.50  Moreover, the Court has done this largely without 
                                                          
49 See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 
703, 710-13 (1975). 
50 See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (right to just 
compensation under Fifth Amendment); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (freedom 
of speech under First Amendment); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free 
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the benefit of any explicit authority in the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment or in the historical record of its adoption — a method of 
proceeding that is obviously dubious, if not illegitimate, from the points 
of view of both textualism and originalism.51  Nevertheless, non-
originalists claim that the uncertainty and profound disruption of settled 
expectations that would follow upon a truly radical change of these and 
other precedents according to the strict tenets of originalism and 
textualism would give affront to one of the most cherished values 
underlying the rule of law: namely, maintaining judicial continuity in the 
present with the official acts performed by judges in the past.52 
As for the alleged imperative to “strictly construe” the language of 
the Constitution, non-originalists also point out that numerous 
difficulties and absurdities would arise if this kind of textual formalism 
were applied to all parts of the Constitution.  For example, are women 
currently ineligible to become President of the United States because the 
text of the Constitution refers to the president as “He” and because the 
framers plainly intended that presidential candidates be male?53  As this 
example suggests, non-originalists assert that although originalism and 
textualism both claim to be democracy-enhancing (inasmuch as they try 
to preclude constitutional evolution through “loose” interpretations made 
by unelected judges), in practice they can operate in an anti-majoritarian 
way by rigidly tying the law of the present to an outdated set of 
assumptions and preferences that the vast majority of people in the 
current society do not share.54  Lawrence Lessig, a non-originalist 
academician, implies that there is no easy answer to the question of 
which approach — originalism or non-originalism — is more consistent 
with democracy when he asks, “What does fidelity [to the Constitution] 
                                                          
exercise of religion under First Amendment); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) 
(Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel under Sixth Amendment); Robinson 
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and 
unusual punishments). 
51 U.S. Const. amend. 14.  See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 18 (noting that the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to apply the Bill of Rights to the 
states); Grey, supra note 49, at 711-12. 
52 Grey, supra note 49, at 710. 
53 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.1 (“He shall hold his Office . . . .”); see Richard B. 
Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745, 
795-97 (1983). 
54 Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory: Fidelity as Translation: Fidelity 
and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1416 (1997); Sanford Levinson, Law as 
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 379 (1982) (noting the “problem of explaining why 
intentions of long-dead people from a different social world should influence us”). 
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require when what they [the framers] presupposed is no longer 
presupposed by us?”55  It has even been argued that a certain degree of 
Supreme Court “activism” can be democratically justified by the fact 
that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, Congress possesses 
the power to make “Exceptions” to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, 
thereby ensuring at least some degree of democratic control over the 
ability of the Court to impose values that the People’s representatives 
reject.56 
Other non-originalists point out that there is no unambiguously 
knowable “intent of the framers” that could be followed, even if it were 
desirable to do so.57  Determining a single intent of the framers 
concerning a given provision of the Constitution is often extremely 
difficult if not impossible, inasmuch as the historical record is frequently 
incomplete, inaccurate, and sometimes self-contradictory.  What is more, 
the entities that ratified the Constitution and its amendments were not a 
single author — they were collections of a large number of individuals 
(for example, state legislatures and Congress).  Non-originalists point 
out that a collectivity cannot rightly be said to possess the attribute of 
intentionality except in a purely metaphorical sense.58  Yet originalists 
seem to think or pretend otherwise, thereby unjustifiably reifying 
collectivities as a person-with-an-intent based on the model of a single 
author.59  Some non-originalists have also noted that there is absolutely 
no evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the original Constitution 
believed that subsequent interpretations of their work would or should 
rely on documentary sources between 1787 and 1789 to determine 
constitutional meaning, and that there is, on the contrary, positive 
evidence that they believed that the meaning of the Constitution would 
and should only become evident over time, in response to changing 
                                                          
55 Lessig, supra note 54, at 1416. 
56 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING 
BY THE JUDICIARY 125-39 (1982). 
57 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 24. 
58 See Levinson, supra note 54, at 379 (1982) (“Even literary critics most committed to 
the existence of objective meaning through recovery of authorial intent . . . admit that 
their approach applies only to individually authored works, and therefore cannot be used 
to analyze a document like the Constitution.”); John Wofford, The Blinding Light: The 
Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L.REV. 502, 508-09 (1964). 
59 Compare Brest, supra note 36, at 214 (arguing that “an intentionalist must 
necessarily use circumstantial evidence to educe a collective or general intent”) with 
Levinson, supra note 54, at 379 (noting that the concept of authorial intent applies only 
to works written by a single author). 
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historical circumstances.60  This evidence of the original understanding 
of original intent gives rise to a strange kind of logical reversal or 
paradox: strictly speaking, the tenets of originalism would require judges 
to be non-originalists if the framers themselves intended that future 
judges would not be bound by their specific intentions and conceptions.  
If, as one constitutional historian has said, the prevailing rules of 
interpretation in the late eighteenth century “did not yet permit the 
recourse to historical evidence that a sound theory of originalism would 
require,”61 then it would seem that originalism is left hanging in the air 
without any foundation other than the political will (and discretion) of 
the judge who chooses to apply its methods regardless of what the 
framers may have thought of them. 
Another philosophical critique of textualism and originalism claims 
that these methods rest on mistaken views of what I will call here the 
metaphysics of interpretation.  For one thing, the theory that 
constitutional provisions can have a “plain meaning” and that the 
historical record can be consistent with a single “clear intent” seems to 
flounder on the reality that equally competent and rational readers are 
able, in good faith, to disagree about what those meanings are.  
Moreover, there appears to be an ontological confusion at work in 
textualism’s and originalism’s minimum premise that if there is a 
widespread (or even universal) consensus among judges on how to 
decide “easy” constitutional cases, then this implies, at least in these 
cases, that there must be a “plain meaning” to which the words of the 
Constitution or the historical records refer.62  For instance, H.L.A. Hart 
correctly observes that human communication, including the regulation 
of conduct by legal rules, requires a consensus in the use of language 
that is broad enough to cover a large number of standard instances — a 
host of “familiar, generally unchallenged cases,” as he puts it.63  
However, a non-originalist would say that Hart all too readily leaps from 
this simple fact to the ambiguous and doubtful conclusion that when 
people use linguistic signs in a standard and unproblematic way this is 
                                                          
60 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885 (1985). 
61 Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13 CONST. 
COMMENT. 159, 175 (1996). 
62 See Louis E.  Wolcher, Ronald Dworkin’s Right Answers Thesis Through the Lens of 
Wittgenstein, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 43, 48 (1997). 
63 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 21, at 123. 
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because there is a “core of settled meaning” to which the signs refer.64  If 
Hart’s thesis that legal words have “core” meanings asserts the 
psychological or phenomenological claim that people always experience 
something called “the meaning” of a linguistic sign before they use it, 
then the claim is false, as the previous discussion of the distinction 
between interpretation and reception shows, and as Hart’s own reference 
to “automatic” responses to easy cases appears to admit.65  On the other 
hand, if Hart’s thesis holds that regularities of behavior in easy cases 
must be explained by some invisible metaphysical meaning that is a 
property or referent of the rule itself — as opposed to an aspect of how it 
is received — then his reasoning appears to conflate the phenomenon of 
grounding with the phenomenon of causal explanation. 
This last point needs a bit of explanation.  Although judges 
frequently ground their constitutional decisions in statements about what 
the Constitution means, this does not imply that the Constitution has a 
metaphysically determinate “meaning” that causes them to decide as 
they do.  Hart commits something akin to the genetic fallacy by 
assuming that regularities of behavior within a historically similar group 
of people (Supreme Court justices unanimously agreeing in “easy” 
cases, for instance) must be based on something more important or real 
(the “meaning” of the Constitution) than the plain fact that these people 
belong to a group all of whose members simply receive the 
constitutional text the same way in deciding the cases in question.  If a 
group of people were all to look at the sky and exclaim in unison, 
“There’s a bird,” we would have criteria for deciding both what their 
words refer to (a small winged creature with feathers and a beak, etc.) 
and where to look for it (the sky).  But Hart’s only criterion for a legal 
text’s meaning-the-same to many judges is that they behave the same 
way in response to it.  He thus provides no criterion and no evidence that 
there is such a thing as the “core meaning” of a text which exists 
independently of its use.  It is as if I were to say that when I have a 
sensation the sensation itself is a private object that I have inside my 
mind — a Humean thesis that Wittgenstein rebuts decisively by giving 
this famous “beetle in the box” example in the Philosophical 
Investigations: 
                                                          
64 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
593, 614 (1958). 
65 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 21, at 123. 
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Suppose everyone has a box with something in it: we 
call it a “beetle.”  No one can look into anyone else’s 
box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only 
by looking at his beetle — Here it would be quite 
possible for everyone to have something different in his 
box.  One might even imagine such a thing constantly 
changing.  — But suppose the word “beetle” had a use in 
these people’s language? — If so it would not be used as 
the name of a thing.  The thing in the box has no place in 
the language-game at all; not even as a something: for 
the box might even be empty.  — No, one can “divide 
through” by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever 
it is.  
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the 
expression of sensation on the model of “object and 
name” the object drops out of consideration as 
irrelevant.66  
These remarks are directly relevant to Hart’s philosophical claim that 
constitutional provisions “have” something called a “core meaning”: if 
the words “core meaning” have a use in legal practice (as they 
undoubtedly do) this is not because there is some thing — some object, 
whether mental or otherwise — to which they refer.  They just have a 
use — period. 
Nor can Hart’s thesis be rescued by calling it a Kantian regulative 
idea — that is, by moving the hypothesis that constitutional language 
has a “core meaning” from the realm of metaphysics to the realm of 
science.67  Regulative ideas orient science to its various fields of inquiry, 
and allow scientists to frame hypotheses that can, in principle, be tested, 
if only with great difficulty.  Thus, the law of gravity is a regulative idea 
that allows us to say that a boulder would tend to fall down (not up) on 
                                                          
66 WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 100e. 
67 Paul Guyer and Allen Wood describe Kant’s notion of regulative ideas (or 
principles) as follows: 
[T]he ideas of reason have an important function in the conduct of 
natural science if they are understood regulatively, that is, if they are 
taken to represent not metaphysical beings or entities whose reality is 
supposed to be demonstrable, but rather goals and directions of 
inquiry that mark out the ways in which our knowledge is to be 
sought for and organized. 
Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, Introduction, in IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE 
REASON 18 (1998). 
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planets in other galaxies, even though we have no assurance that we will 
ever be able to determine that this is true by observation.  Likewise, the 
idea of a “self” stimulates us to search for a unified psychology, and thus 
is a regulative idea for any science that takes an individual human 
consciousness as its object of study.   In Hart’s case, however, there 
appears to be no imaginable method for testing the physical or 
metaphysical hypothesis that legal language refers to a “core meaning” 
other than just observing whether there is a consensus of use.  But core 
meanings are supposed to explain consensus of use rather than the other 
way around.  Moreover, even experimental evidence has shown that 
people can hold fundamentally different ideas about how their language 
describes the world and still be able to communicate effectively and 
coordinate their behavior.68  It takes but a moment’s reflection to 
observe that if someone claims that a consensus of use is “explained” by 
a core meaning that is itself demonstrated only by the fact that there is a 
consensus of use, then such a claim is the equivalent of saying, rather 
unhelpfully, that what is to be explained is explained by what is to be 
explained. 
It is almost a truism to say that legal rules do not apply themselves 
but rather are applied by human beings who must perform work on them 
to make them yield “answers” to concrete cases.  Some more radical 
forms of non-originalism draw from this truth, and from the premise that 
no two events or cases are ever exactly the same, the conclusion that 
every act of applying the Constitution is a new and creative act that 
necessarily adapts the law to what the present requires of it.69  On this 
                                                          
68 See Looking for a Sign, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 2005, at 86 (summarizing experimental 
research by cognitive scientists showing the effectiveness of communication and 
coordination of behavior between people who lack a common set of linguistic meanings 
or references). 
69 See Louis E. Wolcher, Thinking Critically About Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, 
MINORITY RIGHTS, WOMEN’S RIGHTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH WORLD CONGRESS OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 
(IVR), NEW YORK, JUNE 24-30, 1999, 11, 14 (Alexander Brostl & Marijan Pavcnik eds., 
2001) (noting the “Derridaean critique of rights” which takes the form of a 
“deconstruction of any discourse that pretends rights are 'present' as the endowments of 
stable, rights-bearing ‘individuals’”).  Contrast this argument with FRIEDRICH 
NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 298 (Walter Kaufmann, ed., Walter Kaufmann & R. J. 
Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1968) (1967), which states: 
“[T]ruth” is therefore not something there, that might be found or 
discovered — but something that must be created and that gives a 
name to a process, or rather a will to overcome that has in itself no 
end — introducing truth, as a process in infinitum, an active 
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view, a general constitutional rule can be extended by a judicial act of 
will that tries to follow some method of interpreting and applying it, but 
it would be a misuse of language to say that the rule’s “meaning” 
consists in a demonstrable reference to every discrete happening in the 
world to which the rule has been applied in the past and will be applied 
in the future.  In any case, non-originalism’s metaphysical critique of 
originalism and textualism includes the argument that what the latter 
theories take to be the “meaning” or “content” of a constitutional rule is 
only the hypostasis of a finite number of random images of possible 
application that happen to float through the mind of the person who is 
expressing the rule’s meaning or content.70  To quote Wittgenstein, 
whose philosophy of language has influenced many of the most radical 
critiques of textualism and originalism, “there is an understanding of the 
rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 
‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual cases.”71  Among other 
things, this critique implies that the real meaning of a constitutional rule 
can only be shown in its applications, and that it cannot be articulated 
“once and for all” without absurdity or arbitrariness.72 
D.  Three Positive Methods of Non-Textualist and Non-Originalist 
Interpretation 
We now turn to three influential modes of constitutional decision-
making that reject textualism and originalism in favor of something else.  
We earlier called this “something else” constructivism (as opposed to 
interpretivism) because of its inclination to admit to the fact that it 
constructs rather than finds meaning in the Constitution.  One might say 
that constructivism is to interpretivism as legal realism is to formalism: 
the first sees the act of interpretation as inescapably grounded in a 
historical dialectic between text and reader, while the second imagines 
(as we have already seen) that reading is simply an exercise in 
discovering a meaning that is already contained in the text – a meaning 
that is in principle immune to any contamination by history.  Without 
further belaboring this comparison, the specific modes of constructivism 
that we will consider in this section are evolutionism, moral readings of 
the Constitution, and judicial pragmatism. 
                                                          
determining — not a becoming-conscious of something that is in 
itself firm and determined  It is a word for the “will to power.” 
70 See LOUIS E. WOLCHER, BEYOND TRANSCENDENCE IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 108-14 
(2005). 
71 WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 81e. 
72 Id. 
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1.  Evolutionism 
Perhaps the most obvious and widespread constructivist method is 
what might be called evolutionism.  Evolutionists view the Constitution 
as a “living document” capable of changing over time in response to new 
conditions.  On this view, the best explanation of the actual state of 
constitutional law in America is that it represents a common law process 
of development in light of understandings that evolve over time, and that 
Article III of the Constitution represents a kind of delegation to federal 
judges of the power to develop constitutional meaning (including even 
the creation of “new” rights) in accordance with the common law 
method.73  Evolutionists subscribe to a sort of “adverse possession” 
theory of constitutional law (to borrow Sanford Levinson’s clever 
phrase), according to which a proper reading of well-established 
Supreme Court precedents on the meaning of any given constitutional 
provision trumps both the text of that provision and the intent of its 
framers.74  In response to the originalist claim that this method cedes too 
much discretion to judges, and therefore is anti-democratic, evolutionists 
point out that the common law method has been with us for nearly a 
thousand years and that when it is applied in good faith it puts or can put 
very real constraints on judicial discretion.75  What is more, at least one 
proponent of the common law method of constitutional adjudication, 
Professor Cass Sunstein, has responded to originalism’s concern with 
the democratic legitimacy of evolutionism by advocating what he calls 
judicial “minimalism.”76  This is the view that judges should say as little 
as possible in explaining their decisions in constitutional cases — just 
enough to justify the result, in fact, without making the kind of broad 
pronouncements about the meaning of the constitution that look 
“legislative” in a way that offends the democratic sensibilities of 
originalists and textualists.77 
From legal realism and critical legal studies we have learned much 
about the purely logical indeterminacy of the common law, including the 
common law process as applied to constitutional decision-making.78  But 
                                                          
73 U.S. CONST. art. III; See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional 
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 (1996). 
74 Levinson, supra note 54, at 379 n.19. 
75 See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 3. 
76 CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 
70 (1999). 
77 Id. at 71. 
78 See JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS’ REASONINGS 268-74 (1964). 
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remember: the prototypical judges in whom we are interested in this 
article conceive of themselves as bound by their chosen methods of 
interpretation to achieve the legally “correct” (or the legally “best”) 
outcome in every case they decide.  Considered from their own 
subjective standpoint, at the very end of the process of interpreting 
precedent these judges no longer doubt that the “law” requires them to 
do what they are about to do.79  One does not have to subscribe to 
Ronald Dworkin’s elaborate “Hercules” theory of the judging80 to 
believe that a real judge might follow that theory’s precepts in order to 
hunt down81  the “right answer” in the case before her, and that once the 
judge finds what she believes in good faith to be the right answer she 
would experience no doubt about her conclusion.  In other words, the 
distinction between interpretation and reception applies no less to 
evolutionism as a theory of constitutional interpretation than it does to 
strict textualism: if the latter reads constitutional text “X” to mean that 
“Y” must be done, then the former reads precedents “Z” to mean that 
“A” must be done, and in both cases the sense of the interpretation as 
such (“Y” and “A”) is simply received without any further questioning 
or doubt.  To paraphrase Pascal, reception is the “mystical foundation,”82 
if you will, of every genuine event of interpreting the Constitution, 
regardless of the method that is used. 
2.  Moral Readings of the Constitution (Descriptive Ethics) 
Many of the Supreme Court’s decisions, most notably those 
interpreting the “cruel and unusual punishments” clause of the Eighth 
Amendment, employ a method of interpretation that is best described as 
a kind of descriptive ethics.  Thus, for example, the Court in Trop v. 
Dulles held that the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted in light of 
society’s “evolving standards of decency.”83  The Court has since 
employed this interpretive method in numerous death penalty cases, 
including Gregg v. Georgia, which upheld the constitutionality of the 
death penalty for adult murderers largely on the ground that 
“contemporary community values” did not morally condemn the practice 
                                                          
79 See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical 
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 556-59 (1986) (referring to the phenomenon of 
the “perceived objectivity of the field” in adjudication and discussing the consequences 
of this phenomenon for a judge’s freedom of action). 
80 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 3, at 238-75. 
81 This is Dworkin’s metaphor.  See id. at viii-ix. 
82 PASCAL, supra note 47, at 101. 
83 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
WOLCHER - LAST REVISION 4/11/2006  8:53 PM 
32 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 13:2 
as a general matter;84 Atkins v. Virginia, which held that executing the 
mentally retarded is unconstitutional because of a change in community 
values;85 and Roper v. Simmons, which struck down the death penalty as 
applied to juveniles on the ground that contemporary community values 
in America (and, controversially, elsewhere in the world) had 
sufficiently hardened against it to justify an interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment to preclude the practice.86  In response to the originalist 
claim that interpretations such as these impermissibly inject the personal 
values of judges into the constitutional process, advocates of giving a 
moral reading to the Constitution reply that they are only trying to 
determine what the Gregg majority called an “objective index” of what 
most Americans do in fact hold to be cruel and unusual punishments.87  
After all, to locate and follow a deeply embedded moral consensus in 
society as the basis of one’s interpretations is not logically the same as 
following one’s personal moral values.88  Once the relevant index of 
community values is ascertained — for example, by means of counting 
the number of jurisdictions that have adopted or rejected the practice in 
question — this method binds even those non-originalist judges who 
personally disagree with the current state of American moral sentiment 
to apply their findings to the case at hand.  On the other hand, it is also 
true that as a general matter courts do not possess the kind of popular 
mandate and investigative resources that Congress has when it comes to 
determining what “the people” believe and want.  Most originalists and 
textualists take this important difference in institutional resources and 
competencies to be a sufficient argument against the “social scientific” 
method of interpretation that is displayed in decisions like Gregg, Atkins 
and Roper. 
Beyond the domain of Eighth Amendment law, theories and 
decisions that give moral readings to the Constitution sometimes 
determine and construct a set of basic national “ideals” surrounding the 
notions of liberty, equality, fair treatment, and federalism — ideals that 
stand outside of (and behind) the four corners of the text, and that serve 
as touchstones for determining concrete disputes about constitutional 
meaning.  One of the most influential of these approaches has been 
Professor John Hart Ely’s theory that the Supreme Court should (and 
                                                          
84 428 U.S. 153, 181, 190 (1976). 
85 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
86 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
87 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181. 
88 See Simon, supra note 33, at 1505-07. 
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largely does) follow the meta-constitutional moral value of “procedural 
fairness in the resolution of individual disputes,” as well as the general 
background value of  “ensuring broad participation in the processes and 
distributions of government.”89  Similarly, Justice Stephen Breyer’s 
recent book, evocatively entitled Active Liberty, describes his own 
interpretive method in certain cases as relying on the unwritten (but to 
him implicit) constitutional principle of enhancing the ability of ordinary 
people to participate in the processes of government.90 
In addition, numerous Supreme Court decisions over the past two 
centuries also reflect what can only be called a values-based approach to 
constitutional interpretation.  One notable example is Principality of 
Monaco v. Mississippi, where the Court expanded the scope of the 
Eleventh Amendment beyond its literal meaning on the ground, as Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes famously put it, that “behind the words of 
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.”91  A 
more recent example in the same general area of law is Seminole Tribe 
of Florida v. Florida, where even some of the Court’s most ardent 
textualists and originalists joined forces with the majority to hold that a 
“background principle of state sovereign immunity” lurks behind the 
words of the Eleventh Amendment — a principle that determines under 
what circumstances Congress may legitimately abrogate the immunity of 
state governments from suit in federal court.92  The result of this 
reasoning was to impose a limitation on Congressional power that 
cannot be found in the text or history of the amendment itself.93  Along 
the same lines, no survey of values-based constitutional interpretation 
should fail to mention the famous (or infamous) method of “penumbral 
reasoning,” which characterizes many of the Warren Court’s decisions 
expanding the constitutional scope of individual rights and liberties 
against governmental interference.  This method was first announced by 
Justice William O. Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut, a case in which 
the Court struck down a state ban on the use of contraceptives by 
married couples.94  It relies on the moral premise that the Constitution as 
                                                          
89 ELY, supra note 30, at 87. 
90 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 5-6 (2005). 
91 Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) 
92 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 123 (1996). 
93 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
94 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). 
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a whole creates what Douglas called a “zone of privacy” that goes 
beyond the specific list of rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.95 
By now it should be clear what kind of response consistent strict 
textualists and strict originalists are inclined to give to values-based 
methods of constitutional decision making such as those mentioned in 
this section.  From their point of view, respect for democratic processes 
requires judges to obey the constitutional balance that is established once 
and for all by what they receive to be the meaning of the Constitution’s 
words and its authors’ intent, and to forbear from making new law by 
giving Olympian (and democratically illegitimate) readings of value-
terms that are almost by definition as vague as they are lofty.  Some 
textualists and originalists hope to retrieve what the commentator Jeffrey 
Rosen calls the “Constitution in Exile” — the Supreme Court’s late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century decisions giving a narrow reading 
to constitutional provisions like the commerce clause and the Bill of 
Rights, before they were allegedly hijacked by “activist judges” who 
sought to expand the power of Congress at the expense of the states and 
to establish their own (elite and doctrinaire) conceptions of individual 
liberty.96  Those who advocate a values-based approach to constitutional 
interpretation reply to this attack by revisiting the realist insight that 
most legal doctrine is by its very nature inherently malleable and 
indeterminate, and by arguing that neo-formalist decision making of the 
kind advocated by textualism and originalism is therefore both 
disingenuous and potentially anti-democratic.  Justice Breyer, for 
example, points out that his method has the advantage of making judicial 
opinions transparent, inasmuch as it requires judges to give rational and 
persuasive accounts of the relationship between the widely shared 
background value of participatory democracy and particular judicial 
outcomes; whereas textualists and originalists are able to disguise their 
reasoning (and thus secretly implement their own political preferences) 
by appearing to derive the result of a case mechanically from alleged 
constitutional “facts” that may in fact be highly doubtful and contested.97 
3.  Judicial Pragmatism 
Finally, judicial pragmatism is a form of constitutional interpretation 
that attempts to produce results that are “good” for the present and the 
                                                          
95 Id. 
96 See Constitution in Exile, Wikipedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Constitution_in_exile, (last visited Feb. 11, 2006). 
97 BREYER, supra note 90, at 127. 
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future (according to some method of determining the good) without any 
sense of an absolute duty to adhere either to the text, to precedent, or to 
the original meaning of the Constitution.98  Of course, this does not 
imply that a pragmatist judge will never follow what is called 
“precedent” or the “original intent” of the text; rather, she conceives of 
her decision to follow them as being solely a function of her judgment 
that this course of action produces net social gains which outweigh the 
net social gains of any other course of action.  In short, a pragmatist 
judge thinks that adhering to past understandings and ways of doing 
things (including precedent) is a means rather than the end of the process 
of interpretation.99  Perhaps the most visible and important modern 
method for producing judgments about which interpretation is 
pragmatically “best” is cost-benefit analysis, a social science technique 
that attempts to supplant both guesswork and a judge’s personal 
preferences with a prediction (if not an objective calculation) of the 
social effects of competing interpretations of the law.100  According to 
Richard Posner, the most vociferous defender of cost-benefit analysis, 
this kind of pragmatism encourages judges to doubt even their most 
cherished beliefs and understandings about the law in order to avoid the 
pitfalls of formalism, whereby a judge can lazily or mindlessly enact her 
own unthought prejudices about the meaning of the Constitution under 
the guise of seeming to determine what the text or its history 
“objectively says” to her.101 
Lacking the textualist’s high level of confidence in the capacity of 
mere words on paper to constrain and determine the future, the 
pragmatist judge looks to other disciplines (primarily economics, 
sociology, and psychology) as a way of giving “objective content” to her 
decisions and thereby answering textualist and originalist critics who 
claim that her interpretations are but a pretense for enacting her personal 
preferences.  On the other hand, this kind of pragmatism, like all forms 
of consequentialist decision making, is open to the philosophical 
criticism that it is insufficiently respectful of legal rights simply because 
they are legal rights that officials are bound to respect regardless of the 
consequences.102  In addition, since the pragmatic method is a function 
                                                          
98 Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5 (1996). 
99 Id. 
100 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY 
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101 See Posner, supra note 98, at 18. 
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of the values that the judge herself assigns to the variables that she 
employs to decide the best outcome, this method can be criticized as 
being subjective if not arbitrary in many if not most cases.  The critique 
of judicial pragmatism thus asserts that it impermissibly usurps a policy-
making function that the Constitution specifically assigns to the people’s 
elected representatives in Congress and in state legislatures. 
E.  The Choice Among Competing Methods of Constitutional 
Interpretation 
In the end it would be useful to know what material the Court 
actually does consult (and follow) in order to reach results in 
constitutional litigation.  Does it decide cases based on the “plain 
meaning” of the text? — The “original intent” of the framers and/or 
those who ratified the original Constitution or its amendments? — The 
“purpose” of the constitutional provision in question as inferred from its 
relations with other parts of the Constitution and/or history? — The 
“American ethos” that is reflected in an evolving sense of public opinion 
(or morality) about the meaning of the text? — A pragmatic balance of 
the costs and benefits that would flow from the implementation of 
competing constitutional interpretations? — The Court’s prior case law 
regardless of the precedent’s alleged fealty (or lack thereof) to the 
constitutional text?103  The truth is that at one time or another during its 
long history the Supreme Court has employed every one of these 
methods, sometimes even in the very same case.  And as the foregoing 
survey suggests, each method has its advocates in what has become, at 
the beginning of twenty-first century, an extremely heated political and 
philosophical debate over the proper role of the judiciary in public and 
private life. 
A judge’s choice among textualism, strict originalism, moderate 
originalism and any of the other methods of constitutional interpretation 
that this article has surveyed would be purely a matter of unbridled 
judicial discretion if there were no accepted meta-principles or meta-
values that could act as objective criteria of that choice.  In this respect 
the question of which method of interpretation judges “ought” to follow 
reproduces a familiar problem from the debate between positivism and 
natural law theory: namely, the enigma of why a positivist judge ought 
to apply only the law as it is rather than the law as it ought to be.  To 
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paraphrase Lon Fuller’s well-known description of the “dilemma of 
positivism”: on the one hand judges have before them an amoral datum 
called the Constitution, which has the peculiar property of creating a 
moral duty to obey it; and on the other hand they have a moral duty to do 
what they think is just, right, and decent.104  Under these circumstances 
just what does the widely valued premise that judges should be faithful 
to the Constitution mean?  The judicial value of fidelity to the 
Constitution, which is arguably made binding by the judge’s personal 
oath of office, is not a sufficient criterion to answer this question since 
different interpretive methods yield different answers to the question of 
what fidelity to the Constitution means in the first place.  Likewise, the 
requirement of maintaining internal consistency in the application of 
judicial method may be a laudable enough value according to some 
accounts of the rule of law — Ronald Dworkin’s “law as integrity,” for 
example105 — but it provides no criterion for selecting the very 
interpretive method that one proposes to apply consistently.  It is 
obvious, therefore, that the criterion for choosing an interpretive method 
must be found either wholly outside the realm of positive law (including 
the text of the Constitution) or else within a kind of nether-realm of 
“values” that are widely or universally held to be quasi-constitutional in 
nature. 
It can be said without too much risk that in the United States 
mainstream originalists and non-originalists alike largely agree on a list 
of meta-values that are not exactly “constitutional,” but that nonetheless 
represent a widespread consensus about the moral and political 
foundations of the Constitution.  Without attempting to be 
comprehensive, the following list of meta-values captures the most 
important elements of that consensus: “freedom,” “equality,” “the 
balance of powers,” “our federalism,” “representative democracy,” and 
“protecting individual rights against majoritarian abuse.”  Judging from 
the pronouncements of courts and commentators, these meta-values 
seem to provide the ultimate criteria for selecting the method of 
interpretation that judges should follow in interpreting the Constitution, 
and for criticizing or valorizing the methods that they do follow.  The 
problem is that the meanings of these meta-values in their own right are 
hotly contested, with various “camps” of constitutional interpretation 
disagreeing about what inferences can or should be drawn from them, as 
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well as about which of them should take precedence in those cases in 
which they conflict with one another.106  Unfortunately, there is no 
objective and binding Grundnorm, to borrow Kelsen’s term, which 
settles once and for all what the foregoing meta-values mean for the 
judicial practice of interpreting the Constitution.107  As is true in every 
instance of genuine interpretation, there are many competing meta-
methods (primarily political philosophies) for interpreting the meaning 
and implications of the foregoing list of meta-values, and of projecting 
those meanings down to the more mundane level at which judges must 
choose some method or other for interpreting the Constitution.  Since the 
project of describing and evaluating the former methods belongs, strictly 
speaking, to the meta-theoretical sphere of political philosophy rather 
than the jurisprudential sphere of methods of constitutional interpretation 
as such, it lies beyond the scope of this article. 
But even if this problem were to be addressed forthrightly, the 
question of what method of application a given meta-constitutional value 
“requires” is inherently pre-philosophical.  In short, what constitutional 
“values” such as freedom require are always the product of interpretive 
methods (whether explicit or implicit) that generate an expression of that 
“requirement.”  To do the judge any good, this new “requirement”-text  
must be received by her in such a manner that it leaves no doubt about 
what she is supposed to do next.  The best analogy here is to the word 
“Stop” on a stop-sign, which generally leaves no doubt in the minds of 
English-speaking drivers: they tend to receive it (without interpretation) 
as a kind of Pavlovian trigger for braking their automobiles to a stop.  
One might say that the question of what meta-constitutional values 
“require” simply reproduces the philosophical problem of interpretation 
at a different level, and cannot be answered independently of how one 
happens to receive the value in question. 
 
 
                                                          
106 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
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IV.  METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
A.  The New Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 
On March 21, 2005, Parliament passed the Constitutional Reform 
Act,108 one of a relatively small number of Acts of Parliament in the last 
two hundred years that have made direct changes to the Constitution of 
the United Kingdom.  The Act provides for a “Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom” to take over both the preexisting functions of the law 
lords and certain powers of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council.109  Although the law lords currently sitting in the House of 
Lords will become the first members of the new court, the Act does 
provide for a new Supreme Court building (not yet selected) that will be 
separate from the Houses of Parliament, where the House of Lords 
currently sits when exercising its judicial functions.110  The impending 
physical separation is not just cosmetic, however — it also symbolizes a 
deeper functional separation.  Prior to the Constitutional Reform Act, the 
law lords could (and often did) speak in legislative debates in the House 
of Lords on such sensitive topics as the legitimacy of the death penalty 
and whether legal aid should be afforded to indigent criminal 
defendants; they also regularly chaired Royal Commissions and 
departmental committees.111  Reversing this traditional blending of 
powers and functions, the new Act reforms the office of Lord Chancellor 
to remove his ability to act as a judge in addition to being a government 
minister, disqualifies Supreme Court judges from sitting or voting in the 
House of Lords (in addition to their existing disqualification from the 
House of Commons), and creates a special commission to make 
appointments to the bench based solely on the criterion of merit (albeit 
mediated by diversity considerations) instead of political connections.112  
Rejecting the clever argument that the law lords need to keep one foot in 
the legislative arena so as to better defend the independence of the 
judiciary,113 the legislative history of the Constitutional Reform Act 
                                                          
108 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ 
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shows that its primary motivation was to bring the judicial system of 
Britain more into conformity with the requirements of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the modern constitutional theory of 
separation of powers, both of which stipulate that judicial officers should 
not also exercise legislative or executive powers.114 
While it is too early to predict all of the practical (including 
psychological) consequences that these reforms will have for the actual 
content of legal interpretations — and for the general principle of 
judicial independence — it is clear that the Act’s principal achievement 
is to sever the link, which was forged in its present form in the 
constitutional compromise of 1876, between the highest court of appeal 
in Britain and the House of Lords as a legislative body.115  Although the 
Consultation Papers that preceded and informed the adoption of the Act 
repeatedly emphasize the virtues and advantages of the separation of 
powers, they also expressly affirm that the Act does nothing to change 
the traditional principle of parliamentary sovereignty over the content of 
British law, including constitutional law.116  Writing with a distinct tone 
of disappointment, one leading commentator recently summarized the 
basic premise of the new scheme as follows: “the new Supreme Court 
would operate in much the same way as the old House of Lords — the 
same law lords doing the same old thing.”117  Whether or not this 
ultimately turns out to be the case, it would appear, at least as of this 
writing, that the Constitutional Reform Act does not attempt to change 
either the preexisting rules of parliamentary sovereignty with respect to 
the contents of the Constitution or the methods that British judges have 
traditionally employed to interpret statutes and develop the common law. 
B.  The Relationship Between British Parliamentary Sovereignty and 
Judicial Methods of Constitutional Interpretation 
It must be acknowledged at the outset of our review of the British 
Constitution that the concept of judicial methods of constitutional 
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interpretation, as defined in this article, is fraught with obscurity in the 
United Kingdom.  Partly this is because there simply is no “Constitution 
of the United Kingdom” in the narrow sense of a codified and 
comprehensive set of legal rules that define governmental structures and 
procedures as well as the government’s relations with its citizens.  As 
one commentator has put it, the most that one can sensibly say on the 
subject is that “over the centuries there has been an incidental 
accumulation of ad hoc measures and political arrangements, judicial 
decisions, customs of Parliament, conventional assumptions and 
enactments of successive Parliaments which in sum could be said to 
form the ‘Constitution of the United Kingdom.’”118  One consequence of 
the fact that constitutional development in the United Kingdom has 
proceeded both randomly and at a glacial pace is that constitutional 
theory in today’s Britain is, as Geoffrey Marshall puts it, “a somewhat 
disconnected heap of activities.”119  Since the common law makes up a 
large portion of the British Constitution, it is perhaps understandable that 
English writers have traditionally used metaphors such as “evolution,” 
“growth,” “fluidity” and “change” to describe their constitutional 
arrangements,120 and that the American concept of a historically 
determinate object called the “original intent of the Constitution” sounds 
so odd to British ears.  According to classical nineteenth century theory, 
the rule of law is the most fundamental principle of the British 
Constitution, with statutes being not the source but the consequence of 
the rights of individuals as defined and enforced by judges interpreting 
and applying the common law.121  In the United States it makes sense for 
a judge to say that a well-established constitutional precedent is 
nonetheless in conflict with the meaning of the Constitution, because 
there are two texts involved, one of which is extra-judicial and 
hierarchically superior to the other.  But this sort of standard positivistic 
account of the constraints placed on judges in constitutional cases — 
constitutional text X constrains precedent Y — is inapplicable to 
thinking about the common law elements of the British Constitution.  In 
the latter case the question of “methods of constitutional interpretation” 
tends to get submerged or lost in the more general problem of how 
                                                          
118 CONSTITUTIONS OF MODERN STATES: SELECTED TEXTS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 
12, at 182. 
119 Geoffrey Marshall, The Constitution: Its Theory and Interpretation, in THE BRITISH 
CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 29, 35 (Vernon Bogdanor ed., 2003). 
120 Id. at 33. 
121 See A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
195-98 (photo. reprint 1964) (10th ed.1959). 
WOLCHER - LAST REVISION 4/11/2006  8:53 PM 
42 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 13:2 
courts do and should develop and apply what modern legal theory 
recognizes to be their own creation — namely, the common law. 
A second reason for the relative obscurity of our topic in the British 
context is that the task of investigating and determining the sphere of 
judicial methods of constitutional interpretation has always been 
overshadowed by a certain theoretical obsession with the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty and what that principle means for establishing 
the contents of the Constitution.  The traditional British view on 
parliamentary sovereignty holds that “Parliament (defined as the Queen, 
Lords and Commons acting together) ha[s] the right to make or unmake 
any law [including constitutional law] and that no person or body ha[s] a 
right to override or set aside its legislation.”122  Among other things, this 
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty means that a breach of 
constitutional convention by Parliament produces no “illegal 
consequences” that the courts can address.123  As Lord Reid put it in 
Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, although the courts might regard 
some things that Parliament does as unconstitutional, or even morally 
reprehensible, “[this] does not mean that it is beyond the power of 
Parliament to do such things,” and moreover, “[i]f Parliament chose to 
do any of them the courts could not hold the Act of Parliament 
invalid.”124  Nearly a hundred years have passed since Lord Halsbury 
remarked, in Webb v. Outrim, “[i]n the British Constitution, though 
sometimes the phrase ‘unconstitutional’ is used to describe a statute 
which…is contrary to the tone and spirit of our institutions,…the statute 
in question is the law and must be obeyed.”125  Nevertheless, that his 
point of view still commands widespread respect, if not support, is 
confirmed by a recent remark made by Lord Bingham as chief justice: 
“If Parliament were clearly and unambiguously to enact, however 
improbably, that a defendant convicted of a prescribed crime should 
suffer mutilation, or branding, or exposure in the public pillory there 
would be very little a judge could do about it — except resign.”126 
The principle that British courts are radically subordinate to 
parliamentary supremacy on the meaning of the Constitution — 
including basic human rights — is ultimately grounded in John Austin’s 
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theory that sovereignty by its very nature cannot be limited by law.127  
This point of view is encapsulated in the hackneyed yet oft-repeated 
saying that the King (or Queen) can do no legal wrong: a saying that 
possesses a great deal more legal truth-value in Britain than in 
America.128  One can find this way of thinking about sovereignty most 
clearly and strongly articulated in the enormously influential work of the 
nineteenth century legal writer A.V. Dicey, who held that British 
democracy is ultimately protected by Acts of Parliament rather than by 
judges, and who believed that the concept of the rule of law leaves 
absolutely no room within it for judicial creativity.129  Inasmuch as life 
in Britain during the first part of the twenty-first century is not 
demonstrably less democratic, less legal or less free than life in the 
United States, the historical absence of American-style judicial 
supremacy on the meaning of the Constitution ought to give one pause 
about whether it is or ought to be the sine qua non of any democratic 
society governed by the rule of law.  In other words, judicial supremacy 
on constitutional questions may not be the only institutional arrangement 
that is consistent with the much-vaunted political value of separation of 
powers. 
Be that as it may, however, it must be said that the British thesis of 
absolute parliamentary sovereignty over the contents of the Constitution 
gives rise to a troubling contradiction (or paradox): apparently the 
allegedly unlimited sovereign power of the Queen-in-Parliament is 
nonetheless somehow limited by the principle that Parliament may not 
enact unchangeable laws.130  Here the best analogy is to the old 
theological paradox of whether an omnipotent God is powerful enough 
to create laws that even He cannot change.  What is more, it should be 
noted that in theory and in fact the unlimited sovereignty of Parliament 
was indeed essentially (if quietly) negated by the Statute of Westminster, 
which in 1931 conferred sovereign authority on the parliaments of the 
dominion, reserving what can only be called a theoretical or nominal 
sovereignty in the United Kingdom.131 
Despite the exceptions just noted, it remains the case that “[n]o 
[British] court…has claimed jurisdiction to set justiciable limits to an 
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Act of Parliament,” although every now and then judges have opined, in 
dicta or in their extra-judicial writings, that there may be some rights 
that are so fundamental to the common law that they are not subject to 
disposition by Parliament.132  In evaluating the meaning of this point a 
word of caution is due: in thinking about the issue of parliamentary 
sovereignty it is important to distinguish the role of the British courts 
within England from their role elsewhere in the United Kingdom or 
abroad.  For example, although the old commonwealth was abolished in 
the 1970s, thereby substantially diminishing the appellate jurisdiction of 
the Privy Council, in 1994 that body nonetheless invalidated a sentence 
of death from Jamaica based on its interpretation of that country’s 
written constitution.133  Moreover, the British Constitution actually 
serves three systems — England and Wales, Northern Ireland, and 
Scotland — and the British courts do have (under an Act of the United 
Kingdom Parliament) the power to strike down statutes passed by the 
Scottish Parliament if they conflict with the Human Rights Act, which 
was passed by the United Kingdom Parliament in 1998 as a way of 
incorporating into the Constitution the most significant provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.134  Within the context of acts 
passed by the British Parliament the situation is otherwise: the Human 
Rights Act does not incorporate Section 13 of the Convention, which 
requires an effective remedy for violations, and it explicitly deprives the 
courts of the power to strike down incompatible legislation passed by the 
British Parliament.135  Within Parliament, at least, the notion that a 
statute of Westminster on the subject of human rights might be 
“entrenched” (i.e., beyond the power of Parliament to modify or repeal) 
was widely felt to give too radical an affront to the theory of 
parliamentary sovereignty.136  As a consequence, although section 3 of 
the Human Rights Act declares that future legislation should be 
interpreted as conforming to its provisions unless Parliament clearly 
decides otherwise, the Act also limits the courts’ remedial powers to that 
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of issuing a more or less toothless “declaration” of incompatibility that 
can (but need not) lead to curative legislation.137 
In contrast with its treatment of the Human Rights Act, the British 
judiciary has interpreted the European Communities Act of 1972, which 
is also a part of the Constitution of the United Kingdom, as a declaration 
by Parliament that all future legislation should be interpreted to conform 
to community legislation, at least unless and until Parliament clearly 
declares otherwise.138  As a consequence, a certain degree of what some 
commentators have called judicial “activism” has crept into British 
constitutional law, leading to a series of decisions that either suspended 
or held unenforceable Acts of Parliament that were deemed by judges to 
be in violation of community laws and directives.  The first and most 
notable of these was the Factortame Case, which suspended the 
enforcement of a British statute while its constitutionality was tested 
before the European Court of Justice.139  That decision was followed in 
relatively short order by Regina v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex 
parte Equal Opportunities Commission, which held, rather more boldly, 
that British legislation concerning part-time employees was 
unenforceable because it was in conflict with European Directives.140  
Although the latter decision led The Times of London to declare, on 
March 5, 1994, “Britain may now have, for the first time in history, a 
constitutional court,” no British court has ever intimated that it is beyond 
the power of Parliament to repeal or modify the European Communities 
Act or even to abrogate the treaty on which it is based.141  Thus, it would 
be a gross exaggeration to say that the Factortame line of decisions 
foreshadows the advent of American-style judicial supremacy on the 
meaning of the British Constitution.  Rather, it seems at least equally 
plausible to interpret these cases conventionally, as Lord Mackay (then 
the Lord Chancellor) did: namely, as garden-variety instances of judges 
interpreting one British statute in light of another.142 
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C.  The Connection Between Judicial Restraint and Textualism 
One might think that judges in Britain would tend to be more 
creative or “activist” in constitutional cases than judges in the United 
States, precisely because their interpretations are always subject to more 
or less immediate revision by Parliament and therefore are potentially 
less enduring than those given by American courts.  However, the 
dynamic formula Less Power, Less Boldness seems to have carried the 
day: it is well known that there exists a historically embedded culture of 
judicial restraint in the United Kingdom.  Robert Stevens aptly 
summarizes the tenor of this culture when he writes that “[j]udicial 
claims to be guardians of fundamental laws are likely to be met with 
understandable hostility as a breach of the traditions of parliamentary 
supremacy.”143  Supporters of both major parties in Britain have 
traditionally sought to emphasize the value of judicial restraint, and this 
political fact has had important implications for the methods of 
interpretation that judges have employed to construe statutes and 
develop the common law.  To be blunt about it, for most of its history 
the British judiciary has tended to maintain “the law-is-the-law 
approach” to legal language.144  On this model of decision-making, the 
job of the judiciary is conceived of as positivistic and machine-like: 
judges are supposed to find out what the law is (eschewing any inquiry 
into what it ought to be) by consulting the “plain meaning” of statutory 
words and common law precedents.145  In its purest form this theory of 
high formalism and positivism went so far as to exclude the practice of 
judicial gap filling by construing statutes according to Parliament’s 
“intent.”146  Indeed, it was not until 1993 that the House of Lords 
overturned the age-old judicial rule that legislative debates are not 
admissible before courts trying to answer questions of statutory 
interpretation.147   
We have already given a general account of strict textualism — the 
judicial method of interpreting constitutional law according to its “plain 
meaning.”  Postmodern critics of strict textualism, such as Stanley Fish, 
have claimed that “[f]ormalist or literalist or ‘four corners’ interpretation 
is not inadvisable…it is impossible,” on the ground that every act of 
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interpretation necessarily generates some conception of the purpose of 
its object, and therefore is inescapably creative.148  Postmodern 
philosophy of language to the contrary notwithstanding, however, strict 
textualism is not regarded as impossible by those who follow it in good 
faith, as we saw earlier in the context of discussing the distinction 
between interpretation and reception.149  The continuing attraction of 
textualism in the United Kingdom is partly explained by a very strong 
positivistic streak in mainstream British legal theory, which can be 
traced to Jeremy Bentham’s extreme hostility to the common law 
process and his equally extreme faith in the power of the written word to 
constrain judicial discretion.150  A more recent paean to positivism in 
Britain is H.L.A. Hart’s very influential work, which develops the idea 
that law is a system of rules, analogous to the rules of games, and that 
judicial decision making is and ought to be merely descriptive of the law 
as it is and never prescriptive of the law as it ought to be.151  The 
argument that the distinction between “Is” and “Ought” is untenable — 
because judges have values and political preferences that help shape 
their alleged “descriptions” of what the law is — would appear to be 
more readily accepted by Americans than it is by the British, who 
continue in large measure to trust in the law’s objectivity and autonomy 
from politics.152  To illustrate this difference in attitude, contrast the 
recent widespread obsession of the American media and the U.S. Senate 
with the political and moral values of President Bush’s Supreme Court 
nominees with the following rather droll statement from the 
Consultation Papers of the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005: “It is 
essential that our systems do all that they can to minimize the danger 
that judges’ decisions could be perceived to be politically motivated.”153 
Although our earlier exploration of the interpretation/reception 
distinction will not be repeated here, there are two additional factors that 
deserve special mention in the context of the modern British version of 
strict textualism.  The first pertains to the purely technical quality of 
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legislation in the United Kingdom, where there exists a separate and 
formally apolitical institution — the Parliamentary Counsel Office — 
the main role of which is to draft legislation so as to give effect to 
government policy.154  One consequence of the existence of this office is 
better draftsmanship, and it has been alleged (not unfairly, I might add) 
that “parliamentary legislation…lays down policies far more clearly than 
Congressional legislation in the United States.”155  The second notable 
factor pertaining to British textualism is what J.A.G. Griffith calls the 
“strikingly homogeneous collection of attitudes, beliefs and principles” 
that are held by most of the judges on the British bench — a set of 
cognitive attributes that Griffith characterizes as being both conservative 
and illiberal.156  One might reasonably expect the plausibility, if not the 
attraction, of strict textualism to increase in proportion both to the clarity 
of statutory texts and to the homogeneity of the reactions of one’s fellow 
judges to those texts.  Robert Stevens notes that the idea that judges 
receive and interpret legal texts the way they do because they have 
“inarticulate premises” that have been caused and coordinated by 
historical influences is “a concept…that English lawyers have 
traditionally claimed does not apply in England,” even if they are willing 
to admit that it does apply in the United States.157  However naive or 
politically convenient this view may be, it has nonetheless influenced 
public policy in a variety of ways.  Consider, for example, the way the 
newly created British Supreme Court will perform its functions under 
the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005.158  It is arguable that the United 
States Supreme Court always sits en banc in part to minimize the effects 
of individual bias; but the Constitutional Reform Act authorizes the new 
British Supreme Court to sit in panels of three on the express theory that 
the adverse effects of selection will be minimal in England, where “the 
stiff upper lip of objectivity will prevail” regardless of who is sitting on 
the bench.159 
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D.  Evolutionism and Judicial Creativity 
Despite what has just been said, it would be wrong to think that 
constitutional theory in Britain has completely failed to discover or 
appropriate the insights of American Legal Realism.  In some of their 
more candid moments modern British judges have been willing to strip 
away the veneer of formalism that covers the event of judicial decision 
making, as in the following passage from an essay written by Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson on judicial reasoning: “The features of current 
judicial reasoning are…as follows:  First, the actual decision is based on 
moral, not legal factors.  Second, these moral reasons are not normally 
articulated in the judgment.  Third, the morality applied in any given 
case is the morality of the individual judge.”160  Although Browne-
Wilkinson fails to distinguish between individual morality as the cause 
of judicial behavior (the external point of view) and individual morality 
as the ground of decisions (the internal point of view), it is notable that 
during the past two decades British courts have shown a much greater 
willingness to depart from the ancient tenets of strict textualism in 
statutory construction and in common law development.  Lord Steyn, for 
instance, declared in IRC v. McGuckian that old-fashioned literalism had 
finally given way to more “purposive methods” for construing Acts of 
Parliament, and that “[w]here there is no obvious meaning of a statutory 
provision the modern emphasis is on a contextual approach designed to 
identify the purpose of a statute and to give effect to it.”161 
Even more remarkably, in R (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, all of the law lords accepted the test of 
“proportionality,” according to which judges are supposed to make a 
substantive assessment of the “relative weight” of competing interests in 
human rights cases — almost as if the court had located a doctrine of 
substantive due process hidden somewhere in the dark interstices of the 
British Constitution.162  Just as in the United States the implied “right to 
privacy” of the contraception and abortion decisions resonates 
historically with the now-discredited substantive due process reasoning 
of the Supreme Court’s conservative Lochner-era decisions, so too the 
heightened attention of British judges to moral or political substance in 
human rights cases harkens back to their conservative judicial activism 
on matters of taxation during the 1930s, when the House of Lords 
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construed tax statutes narrowly in order to protect property rights from 
allegedly “socialistic” taxation.163  These moralistic trends in recent 
British case law can be traced at least in part to the writings of Ronald 
Dworkin, which have proven to be very influential within mainstream 
British legal theory.164  I am referring, of course, to Dworkin’s well-
known critique of H.L.A. Hart’s positivism, and in particular to 
Dworkin’s claim that judicial decision making is an interpretive process 
in which moral principles and moral reasoning — including the 
“purposes” of the legal system as a whole — must necessarily have a 
role to play.165 
In a similar vein, many British courts have made use of what can 
only be called a substantive interpretation of the common law concept of 
the rule of law in order to curb or control abuses of the discretion 
exercised by agents of the state.  The pace and the scope of this tendency 
have substantially increased in recent years, during which a series of 
judicial decisions has, as one commentator puts it, “significantly resisted 
unfettered discretion, narrowed official immunities and expanded the 
grounds of review.”166  It is possible, of course, to explain these 
decisions modestly, as garden-variety examples of courts implementing 
legislative intention under a modified form of the doctrine of ultra 
vires.167  Such an interpretation would bring them into harmony with 
Joseph Raz’s well-known claim that the rule of law is a purely formal 
concept, since otherwise it would have to be seen as a full-blown theory 
of justice, which it has never been.168  However, it is also true that there 
is an unresolved academic debate in Britain today about whether these 
cases might stand for a much broader principle, namely, that the courts 
of the United Kingdom possess “an inherent common law function to set 
the bounds of legality” — subject, of course, to the right of Parliament to 
override their decisions by legislation.169 
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As for the common law elements of the Constitution in general, 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson recently expressed what some in Britain might 
call a shocking break with the traditional way of conceiving of judges’ 
relationship with precedent in the following passage from his opinion in 
Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council: 
The theoretical position has been that judges do not 
make law or change law: they discover and declare the 
law which is throughout the same.  According to this 
theory, when an earlier decision is overruled the law is 
not changed: its true nature is disclosed, having existed 
in that form all along. . . . [But] in truth, judges make 
and change the law.  The whole of the common law is 
judge-made and only by judicial change in the law is the 
common law kept relevant in a changing world.170 
To keep the common law “relevant in a changing world” implies some 
method of interpretation according to which the task of keeping-relevant 
is to be performed and evaluated.  From the standpoint of our topic, it is 
not enough to say that in the 1960’s the House of Lords finally changed 
an age-old tradition by allowing itself to overrule its own earlier 
decisions; in addition, one is entitled to ask by what method the court 
will exercise its power to overrule (or retain) precedent.  Nor is it enough 
to say, as Lord Chancellor Kilmuir did in 1954, that “the law ‘must play 
its part in the modern scientific state…the law should be brought in to 
help in the solution of the great problems of the modern State;’”171 in 
addition, one is entitled to ask what method of “science” the court will 
employ. 
If it is true, as Robert Stevens says, that modern British courts have 
reclaimed some responsibility for keeping the common law in line with 
the needs of society,172 it is also true (as Stevens himself acknowledges) 
that “English judges are adept at providing the fig leaf of judicial 
objectivity” in explaining their decisions.173  To the extent that British 
judges actually believe that their fig leaf of objectivity is a full suit of 
clothes, they are following in good faith the method of constitutional 
interpretation that we have called textualism.  On the other hand, to the 
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extent that Lord Browne-Wilkinson is correct in implying that the 
personal morality of judges is both the cause and the ground of their 
decisions, then the fig leaf of objectivity is truly a fig leaf, with the result 
that British “law” is not law, properly speaking.  To be an exercise of 
legal interpretation (as opposed to the implementation of personal 
preference) judges must follow, in good faith, some legally valid method 
of interpretation that they consider to be binding on them — whether this 
method is what we earlier described as “textualism,” “originalism,” 
“evolutionism,” “moral readings of the Constitution,” “judicial 
pragmatism,” or something else. 
On October 28, 1998, Lord Lester asserted in the House of Lords 
(col.1968) that judges in Britain had become a third branch of 
government during his time at the bar.174  But if this is so, they have not 
become a third branch of government in the American sense, for as we 
have seen, in the United States the question of the legitimacy of judicial 
methods of constitutional interpretation occupies a leading position in 
legal theory and judicial practice.  In contrast, it must be said that British 
law currently does not make its methods of interpretation into a question 
or problem.  Wittgenstein once said, “What the eye doesn’t see the heart 
doesn’t grieve over.”175  Judicial and academic eyes in the United States 
see clearly (some might say too clearly) that the contents of 
constitutional interpretations are necessarily linked, if not determined, by 
the methods used to generate them.  So far this has largely escaped the 
penetrating gaze of British judges and academics, who do not think 
explicitly “enough” about the problem of methods of interpretation: 
explicitly enough, that is, if one’s goal is to isolate and think about them 
in their own right, considered apart from the more general problems of 
parliamentary sovereignty, judicial restraint in statutory interpretation, 
and the contents of the common law.  But who knows?  Perhaps the new 
British Supreme Court will begin to generate the kind of political 
controversy over its methods of interpretation that the United States 
Supreme Court has generated over the past forty years.  To achieve that 
result, all it needs to do is begin rendering decisions that Parliament 
acknowledges to be beyond its power to change, thereby stirring up the 
competing social forces whose oxen are either curried or gored, and 
directing the inevitably fervent attention of these forces towards the 
judiciary.  If and when that happens, British constitutional theory will 
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become more like its American counterpart, and, if I may be permitted to 
say so, the world’s many legal systems will become both less 
heterogeneous and less interesting. 
